Exploring Processes of Radicalisation in Jihadist Terrorist Organisations

Investigating different factors that enable the cross-border radicalisation and recruitment of 'home-grown' terrorists.

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I. INTRODUCTION

In September 2001, American President George W. Bush announced the beginning of the United States' "War on Terror" (Gregg 2018) in response to the devastating attacks of 9/11. This 'war' began with US aerial bombings of Afghan cities before becoming a much greater global phenomenon, with countries around the world declaring war on a tactic – terrorism – rather than a designated target. Fears of terrorism have spread globally since the early 2000s, with terrorist organisations operating in over 163 countries, the effects of which are felt most strongly in the Middle East and Africa ('Global Terrorism Index' 2020). Academic literature on the phenomena of terrorism has paralleled this rise, with scholars positing various explanations for acts of political violence and suggesting counter-terrorism strategies to combat this threat. Since the attack on the World Trade Centre in 2001, both academics and the media have loosely addressed the concept of 'radicalisation', yet little scholarly work explores the intricacies of this process. Thus, this review endeavours to explore processes of radicalisation regarding 'home-grown' terrorists operating as part of

Jihadist terrorist organisations, exploring factors that contribute to the recruitment and radicalisation of individuals across borders.

Preparatory for discussing the process of radicalisation, it is important to first establish a definition for terrorism itself. Despite the wide use of the term, the concept does not have an agreed-upon definition (Prabha 2000). Due to the varied conditions in which terrorists operate across both the developed and developing world, as well as grand differences in their methodology, ranging from suicide bombers to mass kidnappings, it can be difficult to establish a concrete definition for such a fluid act. For this review, terrorism will be defined, per the United States department of defence, as “the unlawful use of violence or threat of violence, often motivated by religious, political or other ideological beliefs, to instil fear and coerce individuals, governments or societies in pursuit of terrorist goals” ("Terrorism" 2021).

In extension to this, it is important to explore the definition of ‘home-grown’ terrorism, the type of terrorism that will be the focus of this review. Defining this term raises some difficulties as it incorporates elements of both domestic and international terrorism, and is defined differently depending on individual nations’ perceptions. Whilst most scholars agree that ‘home-grown’ terrorists undergo radicalisation within Western nations, and their acts are against the population or infrastructure of the same nation, there is some disconnect over whether ‘home-grown’ terrorists have affiliations with an external terrorist organisation (Zekulin 2016). Both the United States and European Union neglect to specify whether ‘home-grown’ terrorism involves a connection with a terrorist organisation, whilst Canada’s definition states an explicit connection to Al-Qaeda and Australia is yet to provide one altogether (Zekulin 2016). According to Michael Zekulin, a Canadian security research affiliate, this form of terrorism is continually evolving, with the current wave driven by the global jihadist narrative under the Islamist ideology attributed to Al-Qaeda (Zekulin 2016). As this review seeks to explore cross-border radicalisation strategies, the term ‘home-grown’ terrorism will be used to represent

acts of terror committed against Western nations by individuals who are affiliated with an external jihadist group yet undergo radicalisation within the nation in which their attack(s) is/are intended.

To a similar effect, the concept of radicalisation also lacks an agreed-upon definition. However, in alignment with most complex concepts in the social sciences, a consensus has emerged regarding key features of the process in place of a clear definition. This consensus believes that in defining radicalisation "what individuals believe is less important than how they come to believe it" (Kriner 2018: 20). Jason Leigh Streighter of the Australian Graduate School of Policing and Security conducted an in-depth examination of the 'definitional dilemma' associated with concepts related to violent extremism. In conflating the findings of his work, radicalisation can be defined as "a process by which a person adopts belief systems which justify the use of violence to effect social change and comes to actively support as well as employ violent means for political purposes" (Striegher 2015: 77). Moreover, scholarly pursuits have failed to find direct causal explanations for radicalisation, with alternative approaches reaching the consensus that many different factors can coalesce into the necessary conditions for radicalisation (Kriner 2018). To explore this concept, this review will begin by contrasting two key models of radicalisation, as proposed by Bruce Hoffman and Marc Sageman, before exploring a variety of factors that contribute to the process amongst 'home-grown' terrorists.

II. SEMINAL THEORIES ON PROCESSES OF RADICALISATION

This section of the review will explore two contradictory seminal theories on processes of radicalisation. These theories, colloquially named the 'top-down' and 'bottom-up' models, were initially proposed by Bruce Hoffman and Marc Sageman concerning Jihadist terrorism.

Hoffman and Sageman are two prominent scholars in the field of terrorism and their models have been a topic of wide debate amongst academics and counter-terrorist strategists.

Bruce Hoffman's 'top-down' model of radicalisation was developed in conjunction with his research on the notorious terrorist organisation Al-Qaeda. His model posits that radicalisation and recruitment to terrorist organisations are driven by designated 'staff', with hierarchical structures serving an important role in the process. To Hoffman, radicalisation is perceived as a 'top-down' process with formally organised groups playing a critical role in the recruitment and radicalisation of new members (Hoffman 2017).

Contrastingly, Sageman argues that radicalisation is a 'bottom-up' process which occurs between a small group of individuals. Through examining the histories of two terrorist cells (those involved in the unsuccessful bombing of the Los Angeles airport and the Hamburg cell responsible for the 9/11 attacks) Sageman emphasises the striking absence of 'top-down' recruitment and 'brainwashing', two themes of conventional explanations for jihadist terrorism (Sageman 2004). In conducting his examination, he noted that in both cases relationships were solidified first, preceding any formal induction to a terrorist organisation. From this research he developed his 'bunch of guys' theory, which suggests that individuals radicalise in groups, by social-psychological processes of mutual reinforcement and without any connection to a formal organisation or movement (Maskaliunaite 2015: 9). Only after radicalisation do these groups seek links to larger ones, making radicalisation a bottom-up process.

The debate over whether radicalisation is a 'top-down' or 'bottom-up' process is ongoing, with a breadth of researchers building upon these theories or stipulating variations of the process. Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, of the Bryn Mawr College, made the case that the 'top-down' and 'bottom-up' distinction holds little relevance to the current workings of Jihadist radicalisation (McCauley and Moskalenko

2008). Their chapter, on *Individual and Group Mechanisms for Radicalisation*, provides a poignant example of the difficulties that exist in isolating these two models. If a group of friends move towards radicalisation "after watching videos of Muslim victimization on a jihadi web site" (McCauley and Moskalenko 2008), is this considered 'top-down' or 'bottom-up' radicalisation? According to McCauley and Moskaleno, it is 'bottom-up' in the sense that the friends have not been contacted personally by members of an existing radical group yet 'top-down' as the jihadist group has broadcast the footage on the internet (McCauley and Moskalenko 2008). In the digital era of the twenty-first century, the internet, news and media platforms of radical jihadist groups are their recruiting programs (McCauley and Moskalenko 2008). The above example illustrates that it is difficult to even distinguish between these two processes let alone decide upon a more accurate model. Rather than attempting to reconcile the differences between these two models, a more promising approach exists in identifying coalescent factors. Thus, the importance of this research lies not in the exact methods of how the process occurs but instead in reviewing the many factors that increase the likelihood of 'home-grown' Jihadist radicalisation and enable it to occur across borders.

III. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

A. Fundamentalist Belief

Islamic belief is one of the most widely identified motivators for radicalisation within popular media, yet recent literature conveys the often-overlooked intricacies and varied interpretations of Islam which divide the Muslim world. Whilst research has emerged concerning the role that religion, more generally, holds in radicalisation, these articles have been specifically omitted as this review focuses solely on Jihadist radicalisation. Similarly, exploring 'Islam' as a factor in itself would be irrelevant to this review, as it lies at the core of jihadist organisations and, by extension, jihadist radicalisation. However, this review will

explore the role that *fundamentalism* holds in radicalisation, a factor that operates in extension to Islam through facilitating greater engagement with threats originating from outside religions (Segady 2006).

Religious Fundamentalism is often associated with negative connotations, an association that is largely the result of media portrayal and misconception. Religious Fundamentalism is defined as “the belief that there is one set of religious teachings that contains the fundamental, basic, intrinsic, essential, inerrant truth about humanity and deity; that this essential truth is fundamentally opposed by forces of evil which must be vigorously fought; that this truth must be followed today according to the fundamental, unchangeable practices of the past; and that those who believe and follow these fundamental teachings have a special relationship with the deity” (Altemeyer and Hunsberger 1992: 157). This definition addresses some key assumptions that, firstly, not all religious believers are fundamentalists and, secondly, that advocating for a belief system is distinctly different from fundamentalist movements, movements which usually consist of political violence (Wright 2016: 20). Under this definition, fundamentalism can be expressed non-violently if done through politically acceptable means (Wright 2016: 20). Thus, to what extent does fundamentalism contribute to radicalisation?

While some scholars argue that religious factors are not the predominant cause of radicalisation (Wright 2016: 20), evidence suggests that Islam is more easily connected to violent fundamentalist movements, and by extension terrorism, than other religious groups Wright 2016). Joshua Wright’s article ‘*Why is Contemporary Religious Terrorism Predominantly Linked to Islam?*’, promotes existing data to illustrate that, statistically, Muslim people score highest upon measures of religious fundamentalism compared to members of other world religions (Altemeyer and Hunsberger 1992). According to Pech and Slade, this evidence may suggest that Muslims are more susceptible to the ‘terrorist meme’, an ideal that expresses selective violent

interpretation of the Qur'an and is spread throughout the Islamic world (Pech and Slade 2006). The 'terrorist meme' contributes to radicalisation as it has the potential to provoke feelings of religious inadequacy, furthering the extremist agenda through increasing participation in Jihadist groups.

Intrinsically related to the idea of religious fundamentalism are the concepts of religious involvement and commitment. Religious involvement incorporates a wide variety of activities related to religion, including the attendance of services, engagement with prayer and the reading of scripture. Similarly, religious commitment refers to the extent to which one's own religious beliefs underlie their behaviour daily (Wright 2016: 25). Research by Ginges et al. can aid in understanding the role that these factors hold in radicalisation. Their research suggests that collective action stemming from involvement with group activities leads to increased support for violence against out-groups. Additionally, their empirical findings indicate that the frequency of mosque attendance may increase the predictive likelihood of individuals' support of suicide attacks (Ginges et al. 2009). This is due to what is termed *parochial altruism*, the human inclination toward out-group hostility and in-group sacrifice (Yamagishi and Mifune 2016). Interestingly, and in contradiction to this hypothesis, data collated by Wright suggests that Muslim people do not report higher levels of religious involvement than other religious groups (Wright 2016) and thus, frequency of involvement is not positively correlated with increased levels of radicalisation in Islamic populations. The evident discrepancy between high levels of religious fundamentalism and lower levels of religious involvement creates a problematic assumption. This assumption, made by Wright, is that those with fundamentalist Islamic beliefs may not have the exposure to Islamic education necessary to understand the "nuances, complexity, and context of religious teaching" (Wright 2016: 24). This leaves a large number of Muslim people dependent on religious power holders for teaching and interpretation which, if led by fundamentalist groups that

push an extremist agenda, could make a significant contribution to radicalisation.

Despite this, there exist several flaws in the argument that fundamentalism is the predominant contributing factor involved in radicalisation. The primary concern with this research revolves around what is known as the ‘specificity problem’. The specificity problem exists at the core of all analyses of radicalisation, especially in evaluating the relationship between Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism. (Dawson 2019) As explained by Dawson, this problem revolves around questioning why only a small minority of fundamentalists turn to violence whilst the large majority, who hold the same belief system, exercise their religious commitment peacefully (Dawson 2019). By the fundamentalist view that “forces of evil must be vigorously fought” (Altemeyer and Hunsberger 1992), millions of Islamic people believe that they earn sublime rewards in the afterlife if they decide to engage in terrorism, especially suicidal terrorism. Despite this, only a very small percentage of fundamentalists turn to violence and even fewer commit acts of suicide terrorism. Mohammad promises paradise to all who fall during the holy war; yet, as observed by philosopher Gaetano Mosca:

If every believer were to guide his conduct by that assurance in the Koran, every time a Mohammedan army found itself faced by unbelievers it ought to either conquer or to fall to the last man. It cannot be denied that a certain number of individuals do live up to the letter of the Prophet’s word, but as between defeat and death followed by eternal bliss, the majority of Mohammedans normally elect defeat. (Mosca and Livingston 1939: 181-82)

This observation illustrates the significance the ‘specificity problem’ has held throughout history and how it can be applied when considering the most sacrificial form of terrorism: suicidal terrorism. In adopting the view that fundamentalism is a major contributing factor to radicalisation, one overlooks the fact that almost all who hold such

strong views have already been successfully deterred. Terrorists are the outliers. Thus, it is important to explore other factors that contribute to the process of Jihadist radicalisation. The following factors have been selected for review due to their specific relevance to cross-border radicalisation, a key feature of 'home-grown' terrorism.

B. Social Identity Theory

Another factor that is believed to be involved in the radicalisation process is a type of collective ideology formed through group membership. According to May, collective ideologies provide individuals with a sense of identity by encouraging loyalty to communal groups, endorsing a set of moral values and giving clarity regarding existential issues (May 1991). Through drawing on social identity theory, Harris et al. explain how "intra-group relationships can lead to extreme behaviour and resistance to counter efforts" (Harris et al. 2014).

Social Identity Theory was first conceptualised by Henri Tajfel and John Turner in 1979 to explain group membership. Their theory posits that an individual's sense of identity is developed based on group membership and shared with other members of the group (Tajfel and Turner 1979). It suggests that group membership occurs as a result of self-categorisation, social comparison and the "construction of the self in terms of in-group defining properties" (Harris et al. 2014: 21). Individuals tend to define themselves in terms of the 'in-groups' they identify with, grouping people that share similar characteristics or experiences, while those who differ in characteristics central to the collective identity of the 'in-group' are categorised as the 'out-group'. This forms an 'us' and 'them' mentality that "may lead to negative attitudes and animosity towards the 'other' [group]" (Harris et al. 2014: 22). Whilst self-categorisation is important in identity formation, it can lead to ethnocentric attitudes and dehumanisation of 'other' groups, which are key cognitive thought patterns that have the potential to contribute to radicalisation.

Research conducted by Hogg, et al. extends this idea by exploring the relationship between uncertainty in identity and radicalism (Hogg et al. 2010). This relationship is of particular importance when studying the radicalisation of 'home-grown' terrorists, as a clash in nationality can lead to high levels of uncertainty regarding identity. Hogg et al.'s uncertainty-identity theory, which posits that feelings of self-uncertainty motivate people to associate with groups to gain clarity in their identity, is based upon the principles of Social Identity Theory. In gathering empirical data to support this theory, they conducted an experiment that manipulated university students' sense of 'self-uncertainty' and provided exposure to moderate or radical advocacy groups. The findings of this study conveyed that participants initially identified more strongly with the moderate group, however, "the preference to identify with a moderate over a radical group disappeared under uncertainty" (Hogg et al. 2010: 1061). Groups which are particularly alluring in times of uncertainty are highly entitative, meaning they have a clearly articulated identity, affiliated belief system and requirements for behaviour (Hogg and Adelman 2013), all features which are expressed by radical Jihadist groups. Moreover, Hogg et al. found that group identification and out-group discrimination were strongest when uncertainty was shifted toward the 'social self', underpinning an individual's social world and perception of their place within it. This idea further supports the notion that uncertainty-identity theory, in extension to Social Identity Theory, is a key factor involved in the radicalisation of 'home-grown' terrorists, who often experience a conflict in their nationalistic identity.

C. Shame

Mathew Kriner's article *Tackling Terrorism's Taboo: Shame* provides a conceptual framework to explain how terrorist organisations capitalise on an individual's capacity to experience shame for recruitment and radicalisation. Kriner argues that shame is a greatly understudied emotion, yet one that has a powerful influence on the self (Kriner 2018). Interestingly, McCauley and Moskalenko also examine

a variety of concepts related to shame in their mechanisms-based approach to defining radicalisation (McCauley and Moskalenko 2008). While their work explored many concepts relating to shame including anger, hatred, humiliation and personal struggle, they failed to address shame directly (McCauley and Moskalenko 2008). The orientation of their work illustrates two key points. Firstly, that harnessing an individual's emotions is a critical mechanism utilised in the radicalisation process and, secondly, that shame is routinely overlooked or mislabelled by scholars in this field. According to Kriner, radicalisation narratives are conventionally understood to be a tool of motivation, such that negatively oriented emotions like shame are not "immediately and logically connected to radicalisation studies" (Kriner 2018: 21).

As an emotion, shame holds significant power in "its ability to deeply challenge the core self with or without public exposure" (Tangney et al. 2007). This separates it from other self-conscious emotions, such as humiliation and guilt, which stem from social reactions to experiences of wrongdoing or failure. This differentiation is important in understanding the role that shame holds in 'home-grown' terrorism, as it provides an avenue for radicalisation without individuals having public exposure to the terrorist group they are affiliating with or the injustices they are acting against. Jihadist terrorist organisations routinely engage in the use of emotion-based narratives in their cross-border recruitment strategies, in the hope to unlock feelings of shame and doubt within individuals. In 2010 an online statement was released by Al-Qaeda's notorious radicaliser, Anwar al-Awlaki, who posted the following question to Muslims in the United States:

"With the American invasion of Iraq and continued U.S. aggression against Muslims, I could not reconcile between living in the U.S. and being a Muslim, and I eventually came to the conclusion that jihad against America is binding upon myself just as it is binding on every other Muslim... To the Muslims in America, I have this to say: How can your conscience allow you to live in peaceful coexistence with a nation

that is responsible for the tyranny and crimes committed against your own brothers and sisters?" (Kriner 2018: 21)

Statements like these juxtapose a jihadist worldview against the perceived immorality of the host nation. This call to action is an attempt by jihadist terrorist organisations to shame listeners into relinquishing their attachment to the American identity and instead rectifying their host nation's wrongdoings, whether they have been personally impacted or not. To better connect with potential recruits, al-Awlaki shares that he faced a similar conflict in identity to the one they may be experiencing, concluding that he could not support both Muslim and American values in his total self. Radicalisation narratives attract individuals that are already sympathetic to a terrorist cause, yet they also aim to divide populations into two groups: sympathisers (who are considered potential recruits) and apostates (those who reject the moral identity of Jihadist radicals). The identification of apostates serves the radicalisation agenda, as they provide an entity to which a negative image can be attached, creating an 'enemy' of the sympathisers. The 'radicalised jihadist' framing of conflict, whereby anyone who does not act in the protection of the Muslim identity against aggressors is considered inferior and labelled as a potential apostate (Kriner 2018), is a particularly powerful use of shame that creates concern over external opinions of the self, promoting radicalisation as the 'norm'. Thus, shame presents itself as a powerful tool for societal division, with radicalisation narratives becoming an increasingly effective strategy when used in conjunction with the principles of Social Identity Theory.

D. Rational Choice Theory

The act of terrorism is popularly conveyed by mass media as an irrational act, and by extension, radicalisation is dramatised as a process filled with brainwashing and coercion (Caplan 2006). Whilst Kriner argued that shame, an emotion, is an important factor in the radicalisation process, Bryan Caplan, an American professor of economics, opposes this view in arguing that the decision to radicalise

is based on logic and eventuates from cost-benefit analyses. His work takes an economic approach to the study of terrorism, an approach that has the potential to limit bias by adopting a more statistically-based objective viewpoint than those held in other social science disciplines. Concerning the aforementioned literature of Mosca, rational choice models must hold significance to the radicalisation process as, without this form of logical decision-making, terrorism would be the norm, not the exception. In addressing the 'specificity-problem' previously raised by Dawson, Caplan distinguishes between three groups of people (terrorist sympathizers, active terrorists and suicide bombers) to analyse varying degrees of association with terrorist organisations and investigate disparities between those that commit acts of terror and those that do not. Critical to rational choice theory is an individual's responsiveness to incentives. Accordingly, if the cost of participation in acts of terror fall and the risk of death or imprisonment decline, the likelihood of radicalisation increases exponentially (Behr et al. 2013). However, there is still a proportion of individuals who engage despite the risk. This is because terrorists do not engage in high-risk activities for their own benefit; they, instead, use these tactics because they are highly effective. Often terrorist organisations are too militarily inferior to win a conventional war (Fortna 2015), meaning they take a more targeted approach to achieve political aims and gain greater recognition. The relevance of rational choice theory to radicalisation becomes more evident when considering religious ties, in the form of divine recognition, to the cost-benefit analysis.

This idea is further supported by Daniel Pisiou, who posits that individuals choose to follow a 'career in terrorism', in the same manner in which they choose any other pathway, evaluating its downsides in comparison to the "reward, standing and recognition" (Pisoiu 2012) gained from the act. His research focuses on behaviour, rather than emotion, and considers similar trends to Caplan. Benefits gained from terrorist acts depend upon perceived support and approval from the referent community or social surroundings that are given to the perpetrated actions. However, this idea is limited in its application when

considering the radicalisation of ‘home-grown’ terrorists, as they often act amongst a population with different political or religious views. This creates barriers to receiving recognition and standing, as the group that one is affiliated with operates from across the globe. However, in approaching this idea from a religious rather than social angle, it is clearer why an individual may potentially choose a ‘career in terrorism’. In accordance with fundamentalist Islamic views, it may provide them with reward and recognition in the afterlife.

E. Internet

In the digital era of the 21st century, the internet has become a crucial platform for the conduct of terrorist operations and recruitment programs. Its widespread use by Jihadist organisations has shifted the focus of counter-terrorist strategies, with research into its role in radicalisation becoming a major priority. In 2013, the RAND corporation identified a gap in the literature on internet radicalisation, with many scholars focusing on online content while neglecting to identify the link between this content and the radicalisation of individuals. This gap stemmed from difficulties in gaining empirical evidence, as members of terrorist organisations, whether convicted or not, are often inaccessible. This corporation used primary data drawn from a variety of sources to study fifteen individual cases of radicalisation.

These researchers first conducted a literature review on the topic, establishing five primary hypotheses following these emergent findings. These hypotheses and the synthesised conclusions of the RAND corporation's investigation can be found in figure 1.

Literature hypotheses	Does the primary data support the hypotheses?
1. The internet creates more opportunities to become radicalised.	Yes in all of these cases
2. The internet acts as an 'echo chamber'.	Yes in the majority of these cases
3. The internet accelerates the process of radicalisation.	While there is no agreed length of time or template for radicalisation, it is not clear that the internet would have accelerated this process in the majority of our cases: in these cases the internet appears to enable rather than necessarily accelerate radicalisation
4. The internet allows radicalisation to occur without physical contact.	Not in the majority of these cases: most cases involve offline activity that could have played a role in the individual's radicalisation
5. The internet increases opportunities for self-radicalisation.	Not in the majority of these cases: most cases of so-called 'online self-radicalisation' involve virtual communication and interaction with others

Figure 1: RAND Corporation's Findings

In all fifteen cases, it was evident that the internet created more opportunities for radicalisation as it provided individuals with the capability to "connect, collaborate and convince" (Behr et al. 2013: 24). This is largely a result of the internet's widespread usage and the increasing availability of online extremist content. From these cases, it appears the internet facilitates radicalisation as it is an important source of information, a means of communication and a platform for propaganda. Within the fifteen studied cases, two individuals used the internet to learn how to make bombs, one sought information on how to build a suicide vest, and others searched for information relating to public demonstrations and the joining of radical groups (Behr et al. 2013). The internet also provides greater reach for those seeking to radicalise a broader group of people, making it a favourable medium in the radicalisation of 'home-grown' terrorists. One of the participants was contacted by a member of a terrorist group in Pakistan to discuss

military training while three of the participants spread the word of an Al-Qaeda cell across the internet in the UK (Behr et al. 2013).

Secondly, the internet acts as an echo chamber, normalising behaviours and attitudes which carry a risk of being considered unacceptable in the physical world. This platform enables individuals to seek out material that confirms their beliefs and reject information that contradicts their worldviews (Behr et al. 2013). Six of the individuals studied actively contributed to forums that promoted the discussion of extremist topics, emphasising the convenience of the internet to source information and localise like-minded people (Behr et al. 2013). Moreover, the study supported Weimann's research into the importance of online anonymity, emphasising the benefits this has for individuals wanting to radicalise (Weimann 2006). Participant's from the RAND study confirmed this view, with one stating that the internet "allows those that would otherwise be scared of being seen with the wrong people to get engaged, and one which makes the whole process more invisible to the authorities" (Behr et al. 2013: 26).

While it is a commonly held view in the academic community that the internet accelerates radicalisation, the findings of this study were inconclusive, as the participants underwent radicalisation at different rates. It has been suggested, by researchers including Weimann, that the internet acts instead as a platform to facilitate radicalisation, allowing individuals to engage in the process subjectively (Weimann 2006). Moreover, despite claims that radicalisation can occur without physical contact, findings of this study suggest that both online and offline factors play an interconnected role in the process, with some cases illustrating that offline factors were more influential in the individual's radicalisation process. RAND corporation's research further highlighted the importance of connection in radicalisation: in cases where online factors were more influential, there was still a social element to radicalisation in the form of virtual communication and interaction with others. This opposes the view that the internet increases opportunities for self-radicalisation held by other scholars in the field.

The convenience of the internet presents fewer hurdles to interaction than physical meetings, with 'online' activities often viewed as simply an extension of 'offline' lives. This extension applies when exploring radicalisation, potentially invalidating the notion of 'self-radicalisation' altogether. Therefore, despite contradictions to some of these hypotheses, the internet holds a significant role in the radicalisation of 'home-grown' terrorists.

IV. CONCLUSION

This review illustrates the complexities that exist in the radicalisation of 'home-grown' terrorists, conveying different techniques used by Jihadist organisations to radicalise and recruit individuals across borders. Through first contrasting Hoffman's 'top-down' and Sageman's 'bottom-up' processes of radicalisation, this paper illustrates the need for scholarly literature to shift its focus away from conventional 'models' of radicalisation and toward factors that coalesce in radicalisation. While the factors explored in this review are not exhaustive, they were selected based on their relevance to 'home-grown' terrorism, an area of the field that has yet to be critically examined as the line between international and domestic terrorism becomes increasingly blurred. Further research should continue to clarify factors, other than religion, involved in 'home-grown' radicalisation to challenge the misrepresentation of this process within the media. This research is important in understanding the psychological mechanisms used by Jihadist organisations in radicalisation and recruitment fundamental in the development of adequate counter-terrorist strategies amid a dynamically evolving threat.

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