Moral grandstanding and unhealthy cynicism: How unhealthy cynicism does not necessarily pervert public moral discourse

Abstract

Moral grandstanding occurs when one tries to promote one’s reputation as morally respectable. A concern in philosophy, promulgated by Tosi and Warmke, is that pervasive moral grandstanding generates unhealthy cynicism that propels people to disengage from public moral discourse (2016, p. 210). Nevertheless, I argue that this worry is misguided, since excess cynicism triggers information consumers to employ self-correcting mechanisms that ultimately negate the purported impacts of moral grandstanding. In this paper, I outline two self-correction methods: passive correction through noise reduction and active correction through information verification. In the prior method, rational agents engage in ‘mental handicapping’ and discount grandstanding expressions. This enables people to sequester noises from quality contributions in moral discourse. For the latter method, agents conduct accountability checks and investigate the veracity of claims. This promotes listener participation in public debates. In all, the corrective consequences of amplified cynicism not only attenuate the apparent injurious effects of grandstanding but enhance the quality of public moral discourse.